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Abstract
We study assignment games in which jobs select machines, and in which certain pairs of jobs
may conflict, which is to say they may incur an additional cost when they are both assigned to
the same machine, beyond that associated with the increase in load. Questions regarding such
interactions apply beyond allocating jobs to machines: when people in a social network choose
to align themselves with a group or party, they typically do so based upon not only the inherent
quality of that group, but also who amongst their friends (or enemies) choose that group as well.
We show how semi-smoothness, a recently introduced generalization of smoothness, is necessary
to find tight bounds on the price of total anarchy, and thus on the quality of correlated and
Nash equilibria, for several natural job-assignment games with interacting jobs. For most cases,
our bounds on the price of total anarchy are either exactly 2 or approach 2. We also prove new
convergence results implied by semi-smoothness for our games. Finally we consider coalitional
deviations, and prove results about the existence and quality of strong equilibrium.
1 Introduction
In many real-world scheduling problems, the cost of assigning a given job to a machine depends not
only on the total load of that machine, but also on the particular other jobs assigned there. Certain
pairs of jobs may conflict, which is to say they may incur an additional cost when they are both
assigned to the same machine, beyond that associated with the increase in load. Such conflicts may
arise, e.g., when two jobs both place intensive demands on the same computational resources, such
as memory, CPU, or network access – assigning one CPU-intensive job and one memory-intensive
job to a single machine is often preferable to assigning two jobs that are both memory-intensive,
as the former allows for a more uniform utilization of resources. Conversely, some pairs of jobs
may benefit from being assigned to the same machine. For example, consider two related processes
that need to exchange data during their execution. By assigning these to a single machine, the
additional communication cost of sending messages over a network may be avoided.
∗This work was supported in part by NSF grants CCF-0914782, CCF-1101495, and CNS-1017932.
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Load balancing – the efficient allocation of jobs to machines – is one of the most fundamental
algorithmic problems in the areas of distributed computing and network design. The associated
classes of games, in which players assign their own jobs to machines, are among the most well-
studied within the field of algorithmic game theory (see [6, 8, 20, 29, 30] and their references for
surveys of this expansive literature). Nevertheless, interactions between jobs like the ones described
above have not been extensively analyzed, even for very simple contexts. Questions regarding such
interactions apply beyond allocating jobs to machines: when people in a social network choose
to align themselves with a group or party, they typically do so based upon not only the inherent
quality of that group, but also on who amongst their friends (or enemies) chooses that group as
well. In this setting groups correspond to machines and people correspond to jobs. Although we
will usually talk about jobs and machines in this paper, the questions we ask can be framed in the
context of social networks as well.
In this paper we aim to model and analyze the effects of such interactions. To this end, we
consider two basic job-assignment games, and superimpose a graph structure on jobs that represents
their pairwise interactions. In the resulting games, a given player’s utility depends both on total
load of their selected machine and the placement of jobs by their neighbors in this interaction graph.
Despite the simplicity of the underlying models, the addition of this structure yields rich classes
of games, fundamentally distinct from the originals, with new properties and non-trivial behavior.
Our primary goal is to understand and quantify the efficiency of these games.
Perhaps the most widely studied characterization of game efficiency is the price of anarchy [21]
– the ratio of the social cost of the worst Nash equilibrium to that of an optimal, centrally designed
solution. As the field of algorithmic game theory has matured, more attention has been paid to
the evaluation of additional equilibrium concepts. Some of the most notable of these concepts
are correlated and coarse-correlated equilibrium, the latter being especially important due to its
connection with outcomes of no-regret learning [27]. The ratio between the quality of the worst
coarse-correlated equilibrium and the centrally optimal solution is sometimes called the price of
total anarchy [5, 27] (this is how we will use it in this paper, although this concept was originally
defined as a bound on the results of no-regret learning). The price of total anarchy trivially acts
as a bound on the quality of correlated and Nash equilibrium as well. In the unifying paper of
Roughgarden [27], the concept of smoothness is introduced, which provides a general framework for
bounding the price of total anarchy, as well as for generating convergence results for best-response
dynamics. However, as we show below, the standard version of this smoothness framework cannot
yield tight bounds on the quality of equilibria for our games.
We instead show how semi-smoothness, a generalization of smoothness recently introduced
in [22] for the analysis of a GSP game, is necessary to form such tight bounds. In particular,
semi-smoothness with respect to a mixed strategy is needed to show a tight bound in our games.
We also prove new convergence results implied by semi-smoothness for our games. Our results
illustrate the usefulness of semi-smoothness as a proof technique for natural games beyond GSP.
1.1 Our Contributions
We use semi-smoothness to bound the quality of coarse-correlated equilibrium (CCE) for several
natural job-assignment games with interacting jobs. We show that these bounds are tight, not
only for CCE but for correlated and mixed Nash equilibria as well. We also prove new convergence
results for best-response dynamics in these games. Specifically, we consider the following games.
In the game that we call Balancing with Conflicts (BwC), the strategy space of each of the n
players consists of {1, . . . ,m}. We will typically assume n ≥ m. We can think of each player as
a job choosing among m machines, or as a person choosing among m groups. In the usual (and
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Price of Total Anarchy
Balancing with Conflicts 2 + m−1
n
− 1
m
Balancing with Friendship 2− 1
m
Balancing with Conflicts and Friendship 1 + m−1
n
+ β
α
m−1
m
+ γ
α
(
m−1
m
− m−1
n
)(∗)
Sharing with Conflicts 2
Sharing with Friendship m
Table 1: This table provides a summary of the price of total anarchy upper bounds when n ≥ m
that follow from semi-smoothness arguments. In all cases, there exist mixed Nash equilibria (pure
Nash equilibria for some models) for which these bounds are tight. (∗) This bound holds for the
case in which α ≥ γ. When α < γ, a weaker bound of 1 + β
α
m−1
m
+ γ
α
m−1
m
can be derived instead.
thoroughly analyzed) load balancing game, the cost to a player choosing machine k is an increasing
function of |Xk|, where Xk is the set of players who choose machine k. In the BwC game we are also
given an undirected graph G = (V,E) in which nodes correspond to players and an edge represents
a conflict between these players. Two players who are neighbors in G and are assigned to the same
machine both incur an additional cost. Specifically, the cost of a player i who selects strategy k is
ci = |Xk|+ |Xk ∩ {j|(i, j) ∈ E}|.
We define the cost of a solution as the sum of player costs, i.e., c(s) =
∑
i ci(s). Even in this simple
setting, the addition of conflict costs drastically changes the game. Using semi-smoothness, we show
that all CCE are within a factor of 2− 1
m
+ m−1
n
(32 +
1
n
for 2 machines) of the optimum solution, as
well as provide new convergence results. Note that this bound cannot be obtained using arguments
based on smoothness. In addition to various extensions of this game, we prove that strong Nash
equilibrium, which is a solution that is stable with respect to coalitional deviations [26], always
exists for BwC, and that the strong price of anarchy is at most 43 +
2
3n for m = 2. Note that games
in which people partition themselves into two groups while trying to avoid being with others they
dislike is already a nontrivial and important special case [4, 14].
We also derive similar results for the version of this game where players attempt to minimize
the number of neighbors not in their group (the player cost is |Xk| + |{j|(i, j) ∈ E}\Xk|), i.e.,
players prefer to group with as many “friends” as possible. We call this game Balancing with
Friendship (BwF). In particular, we are able to show that the price of total anarchy of Balancing
with Friendship is 2− 1
m
.
We observe that Balancing with Conflicts is essentially a “sum” of a load balancing game and
a minimum uncut game. Similarly, Balancing with Friendship is a “sum” of a load balancing game
and a minimum cut game. However, we are not limited to summing only two games at a time; we
can allow players to simultaneously have conflicts they want to avoid and friends they want to group
with. Furthermore, we can also consider weighted sums of these games to reflect the idea that, for
example, avoiding conflicts is more crucial than grouping with friends. We provide a generalized
model known as Balancing with Conflicts and Friendship with a graph G = (N,E+, E−), in which
E+ and E− are two disjoint sets of edges representing friendship and conflict, respectively. Then
the cost of a player is defined as
ci = α · |Xk|+ β · |Xk ∩ {j|(i, j) ∈ E−}|+ γ · |{j|(i, j) ∈ E+} \Xk|,
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where α > 0, β, γ ≥ 0 are the weights of each game. We provide a price of total anarchy bound of
1 + m−1
n
+ β
α
m−1
m
+ γ
α
(
m−1
m
− m−1
n
)
when α ≥ γ (and a slightly weaker bound when α < γ) using
semi-smoothness.
We also study a utility-maximizing game which we call Sharing with Conflicts (SwC). In this
game the strategy space of each of the n players still consists of {1, . . . ,m}, but each machine/group
k has an intrinsic value (or processing power) pk. This value is equally shared among the players
who choose machine k. Without conflicts, this is a variation on the market sharing game of,
e.g., [2,13,23], but once again we suppose that players benefit from avoiding those machines selected
by their neighbors in some network G. We define the utility of a player i who selects strategy k
to be ui = pk/|Xk| + |{j|(i, j) ∈ E}\Xk|. We use the semi-smoothness framework to show new
convergence results for this and related games, as well as a tight bound of 2 for the quality of
coarse correlated equilibrium as compared to the optimum solution. These results also hold for
weighted edges.
1.2 Related Work
Our games are related to many well-studied games. There is a significant amount of literature
on the subject of selfish load balancing and, more generally, atomic congestion games; consult,
for example, [6, 8, 20, 29, 30] and their references. In the market sharing game [2, 13, 23], there are
locations with values that are divided equally among all players at that particular location. Cut
games, such as max cut, are represented by graphs in which the nodes correspond to players and
the edges signify that two players are either friends or enemies. Although our games are very
related (see Section 5), our results are not simple extensions of known results about cut games.
Hoefer [16] gives price of anarchy bounds for the max k-cut game. Gourve`s and Monnot [14, 15]
explored the existence and inefficiency of strong Nash equilibria for the max k-cut game. We use
techniques similar to [15] to prove strong price of anarchy bounds for our games. Since max cut is
PLS-complete, efforts have been focused on finding good solutions. For example, Bhalgat et al. [4]
give an algorithm for finding approximate Nash equilibrium and Christodoulou et al. [9] show that
random walks can converge to good approximate solutions very quickly.
There are many games that model the idea of players wanting to be close to their friends
and away from their enemies, which is closely related to the motivation behind our games. The
aforementioned cut games model this concept. Clustering games, such as those found in [12, 16],
are clearly representative of this idea as well. Coordination games in which players choose whether
or not to adopt a new technology depending on what their friends are doing [17–19, 25] are also
related to this concept, since players are essentially choosing to be in the same group with as many
of their friends as possible. However, despite the similarity in motivation, the models and issues
arising in this line of work are very different from ours.
The concept of smoothness was originally defined by Roughgarden [27]. Smoothness can be
used to bound the price of anarchy for many equilibrium concepts, and it implies fast convergence
to good solutions. Several variants of smoothness have been introduced [7, 22, 28] to address the
inability of the original smoothness definition to provide tight price of anarchy bounds for various
games. We use the variant in [7], known as semi-smoothness, for this reason. The concept of β-
niceness was originally defined by Awerbuch, et al. [2] and explored again in [1]. Like smoothness,
β-niceness provides bounds for price of anarchy, but only for pure Nash equilibria. Furthermore,
a β-nice potential game (see [26] for the definition of “potential games”) and satisfies some other
conditions will converge to states that are approximately optimal (although not necessarily stable)
in a polynomial number of steps [1, 2]. Other papers, such as [10, 11, 27], show that potential
games can converge to good states quickly under certain conditions. We demonstrate that a more
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general variant of β-niceness, called (λ, µ)-niceness, is simply a weaker version of smoothness. Our
convergence results generalize those from [1,27]; we only require that they be potential games and
(λ, µ)-nice. The games do not need to satisfy a bounded-jump condition like in [1,2], or be smooth
like in [27].
2 Preliminaries and Smoothness Concepts
In this section we present how semi-smoothness relates to various similar concepts, and establish
some of its implications. We begin by defining these concepts for payoff-maximization games; the
definitions for cost-minimization games are similar, and are included in Section 2.3 for completeness.
2.1 Payoff-Maximization Games
A payoff-maximization game is defined by a set of players N = {1, 2, . . . , n} where each player i
has a set of strategies Si, and a payoff function ui : ×i∈NSi → R≥0. We call s ∈ ×i∈NSi a state,
outcome, or solution interchangeably. Finally, there is a global objective function u(s) that will be
defined as u(s) =
∑
i∈N ui(s). Throughout this paper, s
∗ will refer to the solution that maximizes
u(s).
Equilibrium Concepts. A solution s is a pure Nash equilibrium if for every player i and
for every strategy s′i ∈ Si, ui(s) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i). Let σi denote a probability distribution over the
strategies of player i. A probability distribution σ = σ1 × σ2 × · · · × σn over solutions is a mixed
Nash equilibrium if for every player i and every strategy s′i, Es∼σ [ui(s)] ≥ Es∼σ [ui(s′i, s−i)]. A
probability distribution σ over solutions is a correlated equilibrium if for every player i and every
strategy s′i ∈ Si, Es∼σ [ui(s)|si] ≥ Es∼σ [ui(s′i, s−i|si)]. A probability distribution σ over solutions
is a coarse correlated equilibrium if for every player i and every strategy s′i ∈ Si, Es∼σ [ui(s)] ≥
Es∼σ [ui(s
′
i, s−i)]. A solution s is a strong Nash equilibrium if for every non-empty subset of players
C ⊆ N and for every s′C ∈ ×i∈CSi, there exists a player i ∈ C such that ui(s) ≥ ui(s′C , s−C).
Next we define the price of anarchy, which is the measure of the efficiency of equilibria used
throughout this paper, and related concepts.
Price of Anarchy. Let N (G) denote the set of pure Nash equilibrium of a game G. The pure
price of anarchy of G is u(s∗)min
s∈N (G) u(s)
. We can analogously define the price of total anarchy and
strong price of anarchy as the ratio between the optimal solution and the worst coarse correlated
equilibrium and strong Nash equilibrium, respectively. The price of stability is a related concept
that is the measure between the optimal solution and the best Nash equilibrium. Like the price of
anarchy, it can be defined with respect to different equilibrium concepts. The pure price of stability
of G is u(s∗)max
s∈N (G) u(s)
.
Recall the classic definition of smoothness from [27]. Smoothness of a game implies many
positive results about it, including price of anarchy bounds for various equilibrium concepts and
good convergence results. It acts as a measure of the inefficiency caused by the selfishness of the
players.
Definition 2.1. (Smooth Games) A payoff-maximization game is (λ, µ)-smooth if for every pair
of outcomes s and s′, ∑
i∈N
ui(s
′
i, s−i) ≥ λ · u(s′)− µ · u(s).
In the above definition, ui(s) is the utility of player i in outcome s, and u(s) =
∑
i ui(s). Most
relevant to our work is the fact that a game being (λ, µ)-smooth with nonnegative λ, µ implies
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that the total utility of all coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) is at least λ1+µ times the utility of
the optimum solution (the outcome with the highest total utility). This immediately implies a
similar bound for outcomes that result from no-regret learning, and for both pure and mixed Nash
equilibrium [27]. Thus, the price of total anarchy [5] is at most 1+µ
λ
.
Other, more general notions of smoothness have also been studied [7, 22,28]. Here we mention
the one most relevant to our work, known as semi-smoothness.
Definition 2.2. (Semi-Smooth Games) A payoff-maximization game is (λ, µ)-semi-smooth if
there exists a mixed strategy σi for each player i such that for every outcome s,
Eσ
[∑
i∈N
ui(σi, s−i)
]
≥ λ · u(s∗)− µ · u(s).
It is easy to show that a game being semi-smooth implies all the same results from [27] as
smoothness, including a bound of 1+µ
λ
for the price of total anarchy. Notice that it essentially
removes one of the ‘∀’ quantifiers: while smoothness requires that the inequality holds for all s, s′,
semi-smoothness only requires that there exist a mixed outcome σ such that for all s, the inequality
holds. Thus, semi-smoothness is quite a bit more general.
Semi-smoothness was first defined in [22], although in [22] σ was restricted to pure strategies.
It was later re-defined with mixed strategies in [7]. The strategies σi being mixed makes a large
difference when establishing bounds on the price of total anarchy. While in the later sections of
this paper we study games where this provides tight bounds on the price of total anarchy, here we
give a simple example of a well-known game where semi-smoothness with mixed strategies provides
a tight bound, while the standard definition of smoothness (or even semi-smoothness with σi being
pure strategies) does not. Specifically, we consider the well-studied Max-Cut game:
Definition 2.3. (Max-Cut Game) We are given a graph G = (V,E); each player corresponds
to a node in G. Each player must choose to be in partition 1 or partition 2. The utility of player i
is the number of edges between i and players that choose a different partition from i.
It is well-known that the price of anarchy of the Max-Cut Game is 2. However, as we show
below, there is no choice of λ and µ for which this game is (λ, µ)-smooth (or semi-smooth with
pure strategies) for any λ, µ such that λ1+µ >
1
3 . On the other hand, the Max-Cut game is (
1
2 , 0)-
semi-smooth, thus implying not only that the price of anarchy is 2, but also that the utility of any
CCE is within a factor of 2 of the optimum. This demonstrates how previously defined smoothness
concepts can be inadequate for obtaining tight bounds on the price of total anarchy even for simple
games.
Theorem 2.4. The Max-Cut Game is (12 , 0)-semi-smooth. On the other hand, there is no choice
of λ and µ for which this game is (λ, µ)-smooth (or semi-smooth with pure strategies) such that
λ
1+µ >
1
3 .
Proof. Let a graph G = (V,E) be an instance of the max-cut game, and let σi be the mixed
strategy where player i chooses each of the two partitions with probability 12 . For all outcomes s,
ui(1, s−i) + ui(2, s−i) equals the total degree of node i, which we denote by di. Thus, we observe
that
E
[∑
i∈N
ui(σi, s−i)
]
=
1
2
∑
i∈N
di = |E| ≥ 1
2
u(s∗).
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Thus, the max-cut game is
(
1
2 , 0
)
-semi-smooth.
Now we show that the same bound cannot be proven using previously studied concepts of
smoothness. Consider a graph G which contains two nodes i, j and a single edge between them.
Let s1 be an optimal solution, i.e., s1i = 1, s
1
j = 2. Then u(s
1) = 2. Let s2 be a permutation of s1,
i.e., s2i = 2, s
2
j = 1; u(s
2) = 2. Let s3 be the solution in which both players are in partition 1 and
s4 be the solution in which both players are in partition 2. Then u(s3) = u(s4) = 0. We must show
that for any choice of σ such that σ is a vector of pure strategies, max cut is not (λ, µ)-semi-smooth
with pure strategies for any λ, µ such that λ1+µ >
1
3 .
Let σ = s1. Consider when players deviate from s2. If player i deviates from s2i to s
1
i without
player j changing his strategy from s2j , then player i’s utility becomes 0. Similarly, if player j
deviates from s2j to s
1
j , then player j’s utility becomes 0. That is, ui(σi, s
2
−i) + uj(σj , s
2
−j) = 0. We
observe that 0 ≥ λ · u(s1)− µ · u(s1) = 2(λ− µ) iff λ ≤ µ. Next, we consider when players deviate
from s3. Player i’s utility remains 0 if she deviates to s1i from s
3
i since s
1
i = s
3
i . However, if player
j deviates to s1j from s
3
j , then her utility becomes 1. That is, ui(σi, s
3
−i) + uj(σj , s
3
−j) = 1. We
observe that 1 ≥ λ · u(s1) − µ · u(s3) iff λ ≤ 12 . Thus, when σ = s1, λ1+µ ≤ 13 , since λ ≥ 0, λ ≤ µ
and λ ≤ 12 . Similar analysis holds for σ = s2.
Let σ = s3. Consider when players deviate from s3. Since the players are deviating to the same
strategy in which their utilities were 0, their utilities remain 0. That is, ui(σi, s
3
−i)+uj(σj , s
3
−j) = 0.
We observe that 0  λ · u(s1)− µ · u(s3) for any choice of nonnegative λ, µ. Similar analysis holds
for σ = s4.
We have considered every possible σ. We conclude that max cut is not (λ, µ)-semi-smooth with
pure strategies for any λ, µ such that λ1+µ >
1
3 . From this, we can also conclude that max cut is
not (λ, µ)-smooth for any λ, µ such that λ1+µ >
1
3 . 
Finally, we introduce another related notion of smoothness. This last definition of smoothness
is actually a new, generalized version of β-niceness from [1] and [2]. It is much weaker than the
previous versions; while semi-smoothness still implies all the same results as the usual concept of
smoothness (including convergence results, as we discuss below), niceness only implies bounds for
Nash equilibrium and price of anarchy, and says nothing about CCE or price of total anarchy.
However, it is sufficient to provide good convergence results.
Definition 2.5. (Nice Games) A payoff-maximization game is (λ, µ)-nice if for every outcome
s, there exists an outcome s′ such that∑
i∈N
ui(s
′
i, s−i) ≥ λ · u(s∗)− µ · u(s).
Recall the definition of β-niceness from [1]: a payoff-maximization game is β-nice if for every
outcome s, β · u(s) +∑i∈N (ui(sbi , s−i)− ui(s)) ≥ u(s∗), where sbi denotes the best response of
player i in state s. Rearranging the terms demonstrates that if a game is β-nice, then it is (λ, µ)-
nice with λ = 1, µ = β − 1, and ∀s, s′ = (sb1, . . . , sbn). In fact, if a game is (λ, µ)-nice, then
for every state s, we can always define s′ to be the vector of best responses
(
sb1, . . . , s
b
n
)
, because∑
i∈N ui(s
b
i , s−i) ≥
∑
i∈N ui(s
′
i, s−i) for any other choice of s
′. We frame β-niceness as (λ, µ)-
niceness to allow us to prove our convergence results more easily and to make it clear that niceness
is a generalization of smoothness.
The difference between nice and semi-smooth games is that s′ is allowed to depend on s, while
in semi-smooth games σ must be a single mixed state, independent of s. It is easy to verify that
while niceness implies a bound of 1+µ
λ
on price of anarchy, to show the same results for CCE or
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no-regret outcomes, the solution that the players are “switching to” must be independent of s. It
follows from their definitions that for fixed λ, µ, (λ, µ)-smooth games ⊆ (λ, µ)-semi-smooth games
⊆ (λ, µ)-nice games.
2.2 Convergence Results for Payoff-Maximization Games
Now that we have defined various concepts related to smoothness, and established which of these
concepts imply bounds on the quality of CCE and/or Nash equilibrium, we proceed to describe
convergence results, which only require that a game is nice, and therefore also hold for all the
concepts mentioned above. Note that as in [1, 27], these results only hold for potential games [24].
We define ∆i(s) = ui(s
b
i , s−i)− ui(s), where sbi is the best response of player i to state s, as the
amount of utility player i gains from deviating, and ∆(s) =
∑
i∈N ∆i(s). When we refer to the BR
dynamics, we will mean a sequence of best response moves in which the player selected to make
their move is the one with the maximum improvement ∆i(s) [1]. Similar results can be shown for
many other types of best response dynamics.
The first convergence result is a slight generalization of the one given by [27], with the proof
being essentially the same. It works for more general potential functions instead of being restricted
to lower potential functions, as in [27]. As usual, s∗ refers to the solution with highest utility.
Theorem 2.6. Consider any payoff-maximization game H that has an exact potential function
Φ(s) such that for some B ≥ 1, we have that u(s) ≥ 1
B
Φ(s) and is (λ, µ)-nice. Let ρ = λ1+µ . Then,
for any ǫ > 0, the BR dynamic reaches a state st with u(st) ≥ ρ1+ǫ · u(s∗) from any starting state
s0 in at most O
(
Bn
ǫ(1+µ) log(B · u(s∗))
)
steps.
Note that the above theorem does not say that all states after state st will be good, just
that a good state will be reached in a small amount of time. Our second convergence result is a
generalization of the convergence result for perfect β-nice games in [1]. Our version of this result
does not require the game to be perfect and allows more general potential functions.
Theorem 2.7. Consider any payoff-maximization game H that has an exact potential function
Φ(s) such that for some A,B ≥ 1, we have that AΦ(s) ≥ u(s) ≥ 1
B
Φ(s) and is (λ, µ)-nice. Let
ρ = λ1+µ . Then, for any ǫ > 0, the BR dynamic reaches a state s
t with u(st) ≥ ρ(1−ǫ)
AB
· u(s∗) in
at most O
(
n
A(1+µ) log
1
ǫ
)
steps from any initial state. Furthermore, all future states reached with
best-response dynamics will satisfy this approximation factor as well.
Proof. Let i be the player selected by the BR dynamic at any given time step. By our hypotheses
about Φ(s) and the definition of (λ, µ)-nice,
Φ(sbi , s−i)− Φ(s) = ui(sbi , s−i)− ui(s)
≥ ∆(s)
n
≥ λ · u(s
∗)− (1 + µ) · u(s)
n
≥ λ · u(s
∗)−A(1 + µ)Φ(s)
n
.
Let f(s) = λ·u(s
∗)−A(1+µ)Φ(s)
n
. Then f(s) − f(sbi , s−i) = A(1+µ)n
(
Φ(sbi , s−i)− Φ(s)
) ≥ A(1+µ)
n
f(s),
which implies that f(sbi , s−i) ≤
(
1− A(1+µ)
n
)
f(s). Thus, from a starting state s0, the BR dynamic
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converges to a state st with
f(st) ≤
(
1− A(1 + µ)
n
)t
f(s0).
We can set t = ⌈ n
A(1+µ) ln
1
ǫ
⌉. Using the fact that (1− 1
x
)x ≤ 1/e, we are able to derive that
f(st) ≤ eln ǫ−1f(s0) ≤ ǫ · f(s0) ≤ ǫλ·u(s∗)
n
. Finally, using these results and our Φ(s) bounds, we can
derive
u(st) ≥ 1
B
Φ(st)
=
n
AB(1 + µ)
(
λ · u(s∗)
n
− f(st)
)
≥ n
AB(1 + µ)
(
(1− ǫ)λ · u(s
∗)
n
)
≥ ρ(1− ǫ)
AB
· u(s∗).
Because Φ(st) ≥ ρ(1−ǫ)
A
·u(s∗), we know that this approximation factor will hold for all future states
reached by best-response dynamics as well, since Φ will only increase. 
2.3 Cost-Minimization Games
While above we defined everything for utility-maximization games, the same concepts can be defined
and results hold for cost-minimization games. For completeness, we define these concepts here.
Definition 2.8. (Smooth Games) A cost-minimization game is (λ, µ)-smooth if for every pair
of outcomes s and s′, ∑
i∈N
ci(s
′
i, s−i) ≤ λ · c(s′) + µ · c(s).
Definition 2.9. (Semi-Smooth Games) A cost-minimization game is (λ, µ)-semi-smooth if there
exists a mixed strategy σi for each player i such that for every outcome s,
Eσ
[∑
i∈N
ci(σi, s−i)
]
≤ λ · c(s∗) + µ · c(s).
If a cost-minimization game is (λ, µ)-semi-smooth, then the price of anarchy for coarse correlated
equilibria is at most λ1−µ .
Definition 2.10. (Nice Games) A cost-minimization game is (λ, µ)-nice if for every outcome s,
there exists an outcome s′ such that∑
i∈N
ci(s
′
i, s−i) ≤ λ · c(s∗) + µ · c(s).
3 Combinations of Cost-Minimization Games
3.1 Balancing with Conflicts
Definition. Balancing with Conflicts can be described as a triple (N,M,G), whereN = {1, 2, . . . , n}
is a set of players, M = {1, 2, . . . ,m} is a set of machines, and G = (N,E) is an undirected graph
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on the players. Each player i must select one machine. That is, the strategy set for each player
i is Si = M . Intuitively, this models a job being assigned to a machine to be processed. A state
of our game is the assignment of every player to a machine, which can be represented by a vector
s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) where si ∈ Si for each player i ∈ N .
Given a state s, letXk(s) denote the set of players assigned to machine k, and let xk(s) = |Xk(s)|.
Let E(X,Y ) = {(i, j) ∈ E : i ∈ X, j ∈ Y } denote the edges between the players in sets X and Y ,
and let e(X,Y ) = |E(X,Y )|. We define E(X) = E(X,X) with e(X) = |E(X)|.
We will now define the cost incurred by a player. For each player, including itself, that is assigned
to to the same machine as player i, i incurs a cost of 1. Furthermore, if two jobs on the same machine
conflict there is an additional cost, i.e., for each player j such that j shares an edge with player i and
j is in the same machine as i, i incurs an additional cost of 1. Formally, for a player i with si = k,
its cost is ci(s) = xk(s) + e({i},Xk(s)). Finally, we define the cost of an outcome of our game as
the total cost experienced by the players, that is, c(s) =
∑
i∈N ci(s) =
∑m
k=1
(
xk(s)
2 + 2e(Xk(s))
)
.
We will show that Balancing with Conflicts has several desirable properties. First, it is easy to
see that Balancing with Conflicts is an exact potential game with Φ(s) = 12c(s). This guarantees
that every instance of Balancing with Conflicts admits a pure Nash equilibrium. The existence
of a potential function guarantees that best-response dynamics will converge to a stable solution,
but this may require exponential time. We will show later that other properties guarantee that
best-response dynamics converge to a good (but not necessarily stable) state very quickly.
Since c(s∗) is the minimum value of the objective function by definition, it follows that Φ(s∗) is
the global minimum of the potential function. This immediately implies that the optimal solution
is a pure Nash equilibrium. Thus, we conclude that the price of stability of the Balancing with
Conflicts game is 1.
We will now give the main result of this section, but we will prove it later. Previous smoothness
definitions were too strong to find tight price of anarchy bounds for Balancing with Conflicts.
However, using semi-smoothness, we are able to derive tight price of total anarchy bounds.
Theorem 3.1. The Balancing with Conflicts game is (2 − 1
m
+ m−1
n
, 0)-semi-smooth for n ≥ m
and (1 + 2n−2
m
, 0)-semi-smooth for n < m.
The following price of anarchy upper bound results for pure Nash equilibrium, mixed Nash
equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and coarse correlated equilibrium follow immediately from
Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.2. The price of total anarchy of the Balancing with Conflicts game is at most 2 −
1
m
+ m−1
n
for n ≥ m, 1 + 2n−2
m
for n < m, and 3− 2
m
for any choice of m.
We observe that when n is asymptotically larger than m, the price of total anarchy approaches
2− 1
m
.
We are not able to obtain tight bounds on the pure price of anarchy using semi-smoothness due
to the fact that the worst coarse correlated equilibria are not pure Nash equilibria for Balancing
with Conflicts. In order to provide improved bounds on the pure price of anarchy, we use (λ, µ)-
niceness. Furthermore, this result has implications beyond price of anarchy; it guarantees fast
convergence to “good” solutions.
Theorem 3.3. Balancing with Conflicts is
(
2− m
n
, 0
)
-nice. The pure price of anarchy of Balancing
with Conflicts is at most 2− m
n
, and this is tight for all m ≤ n.
When m ≥ n, we observe that the pure price of anarchy is trivially 1. We suspect for n > m2,
the actual bound is 2− 1
m
.
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We will now consider how to find good solutions. First, we can trivially create a 2-approximately
stable solution by randomly assigning players to machines such that at most ⌈ n
m
⌉ players are
assigned to each machine. Secondly, we can use best-response dynamics from any initial state to
reach a good state. In [1], Augustine et al. show that perfect β-nice payoff-maximization games
reach approximately optimal states very quickly. One can easily derive a similar theorem for cost
games that are perfect (λ, µ)-nice. A game is perfect if for any solution s and any improving move
s′i of player i,
c(s) − c(s′i, s−i) ≥ Φ(s)− Φ(s′i, s−i) ≥ ci(s)− ci(s′i, s−i)
Since Φ(s) = 12c(s) is an exact potential function, it follows that for every job i and strategy s
′
i,
c(s) − c(s′i, s−i) = 2 (Φ(s)− Φ(s′i, s−i)) ≥ Φ(s) − Φ(s′i, s−i) = ci(s) − ci(s′i, s−i). Since Balancing
with Conflicts is perfect (2− m
n
, 0)-nice, the following corollary follows from Theorem 1 of [1].
Corollary 3.4. For any instance of the Balancing with Conflicts game and for any ǫ > 0, the BR
dynamic reaches a state st with
c(st) ≤
(
2− m
n
)
(1 + ǫ) · c(s∗)
in at most O
(
n log m
ǫ
)
steps from any initial state s0. This approximation factor holds for all
further states reached by best-response dynamics.
We will now focus on proving Theorem 3.1. We need lower bounds for the optimal solution
when n ≥ m in order to do so. This first lower bound for all solutions follows from the fact that
the load balancing cost is minimized when n
m
jobs are assigned to each machine.
Lemma 3.5. For any solution s, c(s) ≥ n2
m
.
Proof. Let x = (x1(s), x2(s), . . . , xm((s))). Let ‖x‖1, ‖x‖2 denote the L1 and L2 norms, respectively.
It is known that for any m dimensional vector x, ‖x‖1 ≤
√
m · ‖x‖2. Using this property, we can
derive
m∑
k=1
xk(s)
2 = ‖x‖22 ≥
(‖x‖1√
m
)2
=
(
∑m
k=1 xk(s))
2
m
=
n2
m
.
Thus, c(s) =
∑m
k=1
(
xk(s)
2 + 2e(Xk(s))
) ≥ n2
m
. 
This next lower bound makes use of the fact that if G has a large enough number of edges, then
the solution will unavoidably incur some edge cost.
Lemma 3.6. For any solution s, (m− 1) · c(s) ≥ 2|E|.
Proof. We begin by considering, for any pair of machines k, l such that k 6= l, the number of edges
between the set of players on machine k and the set of players on machine l. The number of edges
between these sets is maximized when every player on machine k shares an edge with every player
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on machine l. That is, e(Xk(s),Xl(s)) ≤ xk(s) · xl(s). Using this fact and Lemma 3.5,
m−1∑
k=1
m∑
l=k+1
e(Xk(s),Xl(s)) ≤
m−1∑
k=1
m∑
l=k+1
xk(s) · xl(s)
=
1
2
(
m∑
k=1
m∑
l=1
xk(s) · xl(s)−
m∑
k=1
xk(s)
2
)
=
1
2
(
n2 −
m∑
k=1
xk(s)
2
)
≤ 1
2
(
n2 − n
2
m
)
=
(m− 1) · n2
2m
.
The number of edges between players on different machines plus the number of edges between
players on the same machines is equal to the total number of edges in the graph G. That is,
|E| = ∑m−1k=1 ∑ml=k+1 e(Xk(s),Xl(s)) + ∑mk=1 e(Xk(s)). Using this fact, our previously derived
result, and Lemma 3.5,
c(s) =
m∑
k=1
(
xk(s)
2 + 2e(Xk(s))
)
≥ n
2
m
+ 2
(
|E| −
m−1∑
k=1
m∑
l=k+1
e(Xk(s),Xl(s))
)
≥ 2|E| + (2−m) · n
2
m
≥ 2|E| + (2−m) · c(s).
Rearranging the terms completes the proof. 
We finally have the necessary lower bounds, and we will now proceed with the proof of our
primary result.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let s be an outcome, and let di denote the degree of player i in G. For
each player i with si = k, ci(s) = xk(s) + e({i},Xk(s)). If player i deviates to a different machine
l, then their cost will be the sum of number of players already on machine l plus 1 for itself and
the number of edges from i to players on machine l. That is, for each s′i = l 6= si, ci(s′i, s−i) =
xl(s)+1+ e({i},Xl(s)). For each player i, let σi denote the mixed strategy in which every strategy
s′i ∈ Si is selected with probability 1m . Then for every player i,
E [ci(σi, s−i)] =
1
m
(
m∑
k=1
(xk(s) + e({i},Xk(s))) +m− 1
)
=
1
m
(n+ di +m− 1) .
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By linearity of expectation and our previous equation,
E
[∑
i∈N
ci(σi, s−i)
]
=
∑
i∈N
E [ci(σi, s−i)]
=
1
m
∑
i∈N
(n+ di +m− 1)
=
1
m
(
n2 + 2|E| + (m− 1) · n)
=
(
1 +
m− 1
n
)
n2
m
+
2|E|
m
We can use our lower bounds for OPT from Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6 to show that for n ≥ m this
quantity is at most (
2− 1
m
+
m− 1
n
)
· c(s∗).
In the case that n < m, we use the fact that OPT = n and that |E| ≤ n(n−1)2 to show that the
quantity is at most (
1 +
2n− 2
m
)
· c(s∗). 
Given these upper bounds, we observe that price of total anarchy is maximized when n = m,
which implies that the price of total anarchy is at most 3− 2
m
for any choice of m.
We now give lower bounds on the price of total anarchy to show that these upper bounds are
tight.
Claim 3.7. The price of total anarchy of Balancing with Conflicts is at least 2 − 1
m
+ m−1
n
for
n ≥ m and at least 1 + 2n−2
m
for n < m.
Proof. When n ≥ m, consider the case where there are m machines and G is a complete m-partite
graph where each of the m disjoint sets has m nodes. Then n = m2.
Consider the probability distribution σi over Si in which each job i is assigned to each machine k
with probability 1
m
. We claim the product distribution σ = ×i∈Nσi is a mixed Nash equilibrium. We
observe that for all jobs i, Es∼σ [ci(s)] =
∑
k∈M Es∼σ [ci(s)|si = k]P (si = k) . Let X ′k be a random
variable whose value is the number of the remaining n − 1 players assigned to some machine
k. E [X ′k] =
n−1
m
. Furthermore, the expected edge cost of job i is the product of E [X ′k] and
the probability that i has an edge to another player, which is n−m
n−1 . Thus, Es∼σ [ci(s)|si = k] =
1 +
(
1 + n−m
n−1
)
n−1
m
= 2n−1
m
. It follows that Es∼σ [ci(s)] =
2n−1
m
, which implies that σ is a mixed
Nash equilibrium since the expected cost of job i deviating to any single machine k is equal to its
expected cost in σ. By linearity of expectation, Es∼σ [c(s)] =
2n2−n
m
. Since OPT = n
2
m
and n = m2,
the mixed price of anarchy is 2n
2−n
m
· m
n2
= 2− 1
n
= 2− 1
m
+ m−1
n
.
When n < m, if there are m machines and G = Kn, then the state where each job i is assigned
to each machine k with probability 1
m
is the worst mixed Nash equilibrium. The analysis is similar
to the previous example. 
Our lower bound examples given in Claim 3.7 show that mixed price of anarchy, and as result,
the price of total anarchy upper bounds obtained by semi-smoothness are tight. We now provide
proof of Theorem 3.3, which gives an improved bound on the pure price of anarchy that cannot be
obtained using semi-smoothness.
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Proof of Theorem 3.3. We will assume that m does not divide n; the case where m divides n is
similar. In every solution, every player’s best-response is guaranteed to have load balancing cost
at most ⌈ n
m
⌉ because there is guaranteed to be at least one machine with load at most ⌊ n
m
⌋. In
order for a player’s best-response to have load balancing cost equal to ⌈ n
m
⌉, every machine must
have load at least ⌊ n
m
⌋ and that player must be on a machine with load at least ⌈ n
m
⌉. From this,
we conclude that the best-responses of at most (n mod m)⌈ n
m
⌉ players have load balancing cost
equal to ⌈ n
m
⌉. The best-responses of the remaining players have load balancing cost at most ⌊ n
m
⌋.
Similar to Lemma 3.5, c(s∗) ≥ (n mod m)⌈ n
m
⌉2 +(n − (n mod m)⌈ n
m
⌉)⌊ n
m
⌋. We conclude that
the sum of the load balancing cost of each player’s best-response is at most c(s∗).
Since the edge cost of a player is strictly less than load balancing cost, we claim that the edge
cost of the best-responses is at most ⌈ n
m
⌉−1 for at most (n mod m)⌈ n
m
⌉ players and at most ⌊ n
m
⌋−1
for the remaining players. We conclude that the sum of the edge cost of each player’s best-response
is at most c(s∗) − n. Then for all solutions s, ∑i∈N ci(sbi , s−i) ≤ 2c(s∗) − n ≤ (2 − mn ) · c(s∗) by
Lemma 3.5. We conclude that Balancing with Conflicts is (2− m
n
, 0)-nice.
We will now give a lower bound example. Consider the case where there are m machines and
G is a complete m-partite graph where each of the m disjoint sets has m nodes. Then n = m2.
Solution s is formed by assigning the jobs in the first disjoint set to the first machine, the jobs in
the second disjoint set to the second machine, etc. Then for each machine k, xk(s) = m. Then the
cost of this solution is m3 = n
2
m
. Since c(s∗) ≥ n2
m
, s must be the optimal solution.
Now consider the solution s′ formed by doing the following: for each disjoint set, assign all
of the jobs in that set to different machines. We claim s′ is a Nash equilibrium. The cost of a
job i is 2m − 1. If that job is reassigned to any other machine, then the cost of i will be 2m.
Thus, s′ is a Nash equilibrium. We will now calculate c(s′). For each machine k, xk(s
′) = m and
ek(s
′) = m(m−1)2 . Thus, c(s
′) = 2m3 −m2. Since 2m3−m2
m3
= 2 − m
n
, we conclude that the price of
anarchy is ≥ 2− m
n
. 
3.2 Balancing with Friendship
Definition. We now consider a variation of Balancing with Conflicts in which the additional
cost arises from separating players who are “friends”. The Balancing with Friendship game is
identical to the Balancing with Conflicts except jobs incur additional costs for having edges with
jobs that are not assigned to the same machine. That is, for every job i with si = k, ci(s) =
xk(s) +
∑
l 6=k e({i},Xl(s)).
We can use the exact same techniques for the Balancing with Friendship game as we did with
the Balancing with Conflicts game to prove better results: we are able to obtain tight price of
anarchy bounds for Balancing with Friendship. As with the Balancing with Conflicts game, the
Balancing with Friendship game is an exact potential game with Φ(s) = 12c(s), which implies that
the price of stability is 1.
Theorem 3.8. The Balancing with Friendship game is
(
2− 1
m
, 0
)
-semi-smooth. The price of total
anarchy is at most 2− 1
m
, and it is tight.
Proof. We can use the same argument as Theorem 3.1 to show that Balancing with Friendship is
semi-smooth if we use the following two lower bounds for OPT: for any solution s, c(s) ≥ n2
m
, and
c(s) ≥ 2|E| + n. The former follows by the same argument that we used to prove Lemma 3.5. We
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now offer proof of the latter bound.
c(s) =
m∑
k=1
xk(s)
2 + 2
m−1∑
k=1
m∑
l=k+1
e (Xk(s),Xl(s))
=
m∑
k=1
xk(s)
2 + 2
(
|E| −
m∑
k=1
e (Xk(s))
)
≥
m∑
k=1
xk(s)
2 + 2|E| − 2
(
m∑
k=1
xk(s) (xk(s)− 1)
2
)
= 2|E|+
m∑
k=1
xk(s)
= 2|E|+ n.
Furthermore, if we pick the same mixed strategy σ as in the proof of Theorem 3.1, then using
similar arguments, we are able to show that
E
[∑
i∈N
ci(σi, s−i)
]
=
n2
m
(
1 +
m− 1
n
)
+ 2
m− 1
m
|E|.
Combining this with our lower bounds for the optimal solution completes our proof.
To show our price of total anarchy bound is tight, let G consist of m disjoint cliques of size
m each. Assigning each clique to the same machine such that only one clique is assigned to each
machine is the optimal solution. Assigning each job in the same clique to a different machine is the
worst case Nash equilibrium. 
Corollary 3.9. For any instance of the Balancing with Friendship and for any ǫ > 0, the BR
dynamic reaches a state st with
c(st) ≤
(
2− 1
m
)
(1 + ǫ) · c(s∗)
in at most O
(
n log m
ǫ
)
steps from any initial state s0. This approximation factor holds for all
further states reached by best-response dynamics.
3.3 Balancing with Conflicts and Friendship
Definition. We have previously considered Balancing with Conflicts which is essentially the sum
of the load balancing and minimum uncut games. Similarly, Balancing with Friendship is the
sum of the load balancing and minimum cut games. We now consider a generalization which
we call Balancing with Conflicts and Friendship which is essentially a linear combination of the
three aforementioned games. Formally, it is the same as our previous models except the graph
G = (N,E+, E−) now has two disjoint types of edges: friendship edges, denoted by E+, and
conflict edges, denoted by E−. Jobs incur additional costs for sharing conflict edges with jobs that
are assigned to the same machine and for sharing friendship edges with jobs that are assigned to
different machines. Furthermore, the cost incurred by load balancing, conflict edges, and friendship
edges are now determined by parameters α > 0, β ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0, respectively. The cost function for
player i with si = k is defined as follows:
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ci(s) = α · xk(s) + β · e− ({i},Xk(s)) + γ ·
∑
l 6=k
e+({i},Xl(s)).
As usual, the objective function is defined as the sum of all player costs, i.e., c(s) =
∑
i∈N ci(s).
Balancing with Conflicts and Friendship is also an exact potential game with φ(s) = 12c(s), which
guarantees the existence of pure Nash equilibria and that the price of stability is 1.
We will now state the main result of this section, but prove it later. Using semi-smoothness,
we are able to obtain tight bounds for the case in which α ≥ γ and obtain near tight bounds when
α < γ.
Theorem 3.10. Balancing with Conflicts and Friendship is
(
1 + m−1
n
+ β
α
m−1
m
+ γ
α
(
m−1
m
− m−1
n
)
, 0
)
-
semi-smooth when α ≥ γ, and the resulting price of total anarchy bound is tight. When α < γ,
Balancing with Conflicts and Friendship is
(
1 + β
α
m−1
m
+ γ
α
m−1
m
, 0
)
-semi-smooth.
We are primarily interested in the case in which n >> m. We observe the total price of anarchy
of Balancing with Conflicts and Friendship asymptotically approaches 1+ β
α
m−1
m
+ γ
α
m−1
m
as n→∞.
We observe that Theorem 3.10 is a generalization of Theorems 3.1 and 3.8 and previously known
results about the games that we combined to form Balancing with Conflicts and Friendship. Recall
that the load balancing game with identical machines has price of total anarchy 1+ m−1
n
, while the
minimum uncut and minimum cut games have unbounded price of anarchy. Theorem 3.10 provides
many insights concerning how the price of total anarchy of Balancing with Conflicts and Friendship
is affected by combining these particular games. We observe that α acts as a stabilizer; increasing
it results in a linear decrease in the price of total anarchy because it allows the costs incurred by
the load balancing game to dominate the costs incurred by the cut games. On the other hand,
increasing β or γ results in a linear increase in the price of total anarchy, which becomes unbounded
as β, γ → ∞. Essentially, the load balancing game always contributes m−1
n
to the price of total
anarchy, while the cut games approximately contribute the ratio of their respective parameters and
α.
To prove Theorem 3.10, we will now provide lower bounds for all solutions. They are straightfor-
ward generalizations of lower bounds found in Lemma 3.5, Lemma 3.6, and the proof of Theorem 3.8
that follow using similar arguments, so we state them without proof.
Lemma 3.11. For any solution s, we have the following lower bounds:
c(s) ≥ αn
2
m
c(s) ≥ (α− β(m− 1))n
2
m
+ 2β|E−|
c(s) ≥ (α− γ)n
2
m
+ 2γ|E+|+ γn, if α ≥ γ
c(s) ≥ 2α|E+|+ γn, if α ≤ γ.
We can now prove our main result of this section by using the previous lemma to lower bound
the optimal solution.
Proof of Theorem 3.10. For every player i, let σi denote the mixed strategy in which player i
selects machine k with probability 1
m
for all k ∈ M . Using similar arguments from Theorem 3.1
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and Theorem 3.8, we can derive that
E
[∑
i∈N
ci(σi, s−i)
]
= α
n2
m
(
1 +
m− 1
n
)
+ 2β
1
m
|E−|+ 2γm− 1
m
|E+|.
First, we consider the case in which |E+| ≤ n22m − n2 and |E−| ≤ (m−1)n
2
2m . Using these bounds,
we observe that
E
[∑
i∈N
ci(σi, s−i)
]
= α
n2
m
(
1 +
m− 1
n
)
+ 2β
1
m
|E−|+ 2γm− 1
m
|E+|
≤ αn
2
m
(
1 +
m− 1
n
)
+ 2β
1
m
(m− 1)n2
2m
+ 2γ
m− 1
m
(
n2
2m
− n
2
)
= α
n2
m
(
1 +
m− 1
n
+
β
α
m− 1
m
+
γ
α
(
m− 1
m
− m− 1
n
))
,
which completes our proof after applying the first inequality from Lemma 3.11.
Next, we consider the case in which |E+| ≤ n22m − n2 and |E−| ≥ (m−1)n
2
2m . Using these bounds
and the second inequality from Lemma 3.11, we have that
E
[∑
i∈N
ci(σi, s−i)
]
− c(s∗) ≤ αn
2
m
(
1 +
m− 1
n
)
+ 2β
1
m
|E−|+ 2γm− 1
m
|E+|
− (α− β(m− 1))n
2
m
− 2β|E−|
= α
n2
m
(
m− 1
n
+
β(m− 1)
α
)
− 2βm− 1
m
|E−|+ 2γm− 1
m
|E+|
≤ αn
2
m
(
m− 1
n
+
β(m− 1)
α
)
− 2βm− 1
m
(m− 1)n2
2m
+ 2γ
m− 1
m
(
n2
2m
− n
2
)
= α
n2
m
(
m− 1
n
+
β
α
m− 1
m
+
γ
α
(
m− 1
m
− m− 1
n
))
.
We will now assume that α ≥ γ, |E+| ≥ n22m − n2 , and |E−| ≤ (m−1)n
2
2m . We can use these and
the first and third inequalities,
E
[∑
i∈N
ci(σi, s−i)
]
− c(s∗) ≤ αn
2
m
(
1 +
m− 1
n
)
+ 2β
1
m
|E−|+ 2γm− 1
m
|E+|
− (α− γ)n
2
m
− 2γ|E+| − γn
= α
n2
m
(
m− 1
n
+
γ
α
)
+ 2β
1
m
|E−| − 2γ 1
m
|E+| − γn
≤ αn
2
m
(
m− 1
n
+
γ
α
)
+ 2β
1
m
(m− 1)n2
2m
− 2γ 1
m
(
n2
2m
− n
2
)
− γn
= α
n2
m
(
m− 1
n
+
β
α
m− 1
m
+
γ
α
(
m− 1
m
− m− 1
n
))
.
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This completes our proof that Balancing with Conflicts and Friendship is
(
1 + m−1
n
+ β
α
m−1
m
+ γ
α
(
m−1
m
− m−1
n
)
, 0
)
-semi-smooth when α ≥ γ.
Our lower bound example for which the price of total anarchy bound is tight is a combination
of the lower bound examples from Claim 3.7 and Theorem 3.8. That is, suppose there are n = m2
players that are divided into m disjoint sets of m players each. If two players are in the same
set, they have a friendship edge between them. If two players are in different sets, they have a
conflict edge between them. The optimal solution is assigning each set to its own machine. Thus,
c(s) = αn
2
m
. Consider the mixed strategy σ in which each player selects machine k with probability
1
m
for all k ∈M . Then for each player i ∈ N , Es∼σ [ci(s)] = α(1+ n−1m )+β n−mm + γ (m−1)
2
m
. Clearly
no player has incentive to switch, which implies that σ is a mixed Nash equilibrium. It can be
verified the price of total anarchy bounds are tight for this particular example.
Finally, we need only consider the case in which |E+| ≥ n22m− n2 and |E−| ≤ (m−1)n
2
2m when α < γ
to complete proof of our theorem.
E
[∑
i∈N
ci(σi, s−i)
]
= α
n2
m
(
1 +
m− 1
n
)
+ 2β
1
m
|E−|+ 2γm− 1
m
|E+|
≤ αn
2
m
(
1 +
m− 1
n
+
β
α
m− 1
m
)
+ 2γ
m− 1
m
(c(s∗)− γn)
= α
n2
m
(
1 +
m− 1
n
+
β
α
m− 1
m
− γ
α
m− 1
n
)
+
γ
α
m− 1
m
c(s∗)
≤ αn
2
m
(
1 +
β
α
m− 1
m
)
+
γ
α
m− 1
m
c(s∗).
By our first two cases, which did not rely on the relation of α, γ and this last case, we conclude that
Balancing with Conflicts and Friendship is (1 + β
α
m−1
m
+ γ
α
m−1
m
, 0
)
-semi-smooth when α < γ. 
We did not consider weighted edges for any of our models, but the β, γ parameters with α = 1
manage to emulate the case in which all conflict and friendship edges have uniform weights β, γ,
respectively. Increasing the weight of these edges causes the price of total anarchy to tend towards
infinity, because the cut games start to dominate. It can be shown that if we allow arbitrary weights
with the maximum weights being β, γ for conflict and friendship edges, respectively, then the price
of total anarchy upper bound still holds, although it will not necessarily be tight.
3.4 Strong Nash Equilibrium for Balancing with Conflicts with m = 2
In this section we will examine strong Nash equilibrium for Balancing with Conflicts when m = 2.
Note that games in which people partition themselves into two groups while trying to avoid being
with others they dislike already present a nontrivial and problem [4, 14]. For our first result, we
will show that Balancing with Conflicts always admits a strong Nash equilibrium when m = 2.
Theorem 3.12. The optimal solution for Balancing with Conflicts is a strong Nash equilibrium
when m = 2.
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that the optimal solution s∗ is not a strong Nash equi-
librium. Then there is a deviating coalition in which every player in the coalition can decrease
their cost. Call the solution that results from this deviation s′. Let Xk,l = {i : s∗i = k, s′i = l},
xk,l = |Xk,l|. Then the deviating coalition is the set X1,2 ∪X2,1 and the set of players who do not
deviate is X1,1 ∪X2,2.
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For each player i ∈ X1,2, their cost decreases by x1,1+e (i,X1,1) and increases by x2,2+e (i,X2,2).
Since i is in the deviating coalition, it must be the case that x1,1 + e (i,X1,1) > x2,2 + e (i,X2,2).
Summing this up over all players i ∈ X1,2 yields
x1,1x1,2 + e(X1,1,X1,2) > x2,2x1,2 + e(X2,2,X1,2).
Similarly, we can derive an inequality for each player i ∈ X2,1. Summing this inequality over all
players i ∈ X2,1 results in
x2,2x2,1 + e(X2,2,X2,1) > x1,1x2,1 + e(X1,1,X2,1).
Next, we consider a player i ∈ X1,1. Their cost decreases by x1,2 + e (i,X1,2) and increases by
x2,1 + e(i,X2,1). Then
∑
i∈X1,1
(ci(s
′)− ci(s∗)) = x1,1x2,1 + e(X1,1,X2,1)− x1,1x1,2 − e(X1,1,X1,2).
Similarly,
∑
i∈X2,2
(ci(s
′)− ci(s∗)) = x2,2x1,2 + e(X2,2,X1,2)− x2,2x2,1 − e(X2,2,X2,1).
We can now calculate c(s′)− c(s∗).
c(s′)− c(s∗) =
∑
i∈N
(
ci(s
′)− ci(s∗)
)
= 2 (x2,2x1,2 + e(X2,2,X1,2) + x1,1x2,1 + e(X1,1,X2,1)
−x1,1x1,2 − e(X1,1,X1,2)− x2,2x2,1 − e(X2,2,X2,1))
< 0
by our inequalities, which is a contradiction. 
It immediately follows from this theorem that the strong price of stability is 1. We suspect that
strong Nash equilibrium need not exist for m ≥ 3, but we’ve yet to find any such examples. The
existence of strong Nash equilibrium for cut games in general is unresolved, as seen in [14,15].
Next, we will provide an upper bound for the strong price of anarchy with the same technique
used to bound the strong price of anarchy for the max k-cut game in [15]. This technique fails
when m > 2, partially because the technique in [15] is for max k-cut as opposed to min k-uncut,
which is the type of cut problem that we are considering here.
Theorem 3.13. The strong price of anarchy is at most 43 +
2
3n Balancing with Conflicts with
m = 2, n ≥ 4. The strong price of anarchy is 1 for m = 2, n ≤ 3.
Proof. Let s∗ denote an optimal solution and let s′ denote a permutation of s∗, i.e., X1(s
∗) = X2(s
′)
and X2(s
∗) = X1(s
′). Let s be a strong Nash equilibrium. Let Xk,l = {i : si = k, s∗i = l},
xk,l = |Xk,l|. Then
c(s) = (x1,1 + x1,2)
2 + (x2,1 + x2,2)
2 + 2
(
2∑
k=1
2∑
l=1
e(Xk,l) + e(X1,1,X1,2) + e(X2,2,X2,1)
)
c(s∗) = c(s′) = (x1,1 + x2,1)
2 + (x1,2 + x2,2)
2 + 2
(
2∑
k=1
2∑
l=1
e(Xk,l) + e(X1,1,X2,1) + e(X2,2,X1,2)
)
.
Let X1,2 ∪ X2,1 be a deviating coalition in s. By the definition of Xk,l and the fact there are
only two strategies, the resulting state of this deviation is s∗. However, since s is a strong Nash
equilibrium, that must mean there is a player i1 ∈ X1,2 ∪X2,1 that does not want to deviate with
the coalition. Furthermore, there must be a player i2 that does not want deviate with the coalition
X1,2 ∪ X2,1\{i1}. We can repeat this process for each player in X1,2 ∪ X2,1, which gives us an
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inequality for each player. Suppose that player it ∈ X1,2 is the t’th player to leave the coalition in
this way. Let Y t1,2 denote the set of players in X1,2 that left the coalition before it and Y
t
2,1 players
in X2,1 that left the coalition before it. Let y
t
1,2 = |Y t1,2| and yt2,1 = |Y t2,1|. Then
cit(s) ≤ x2,2 + x1,2 − yt1,2 + yt2,1 + e ({it},X2,2) + e
({it},X1,2\Y t1,2)+ e ({it}, Y t2,1) .
Similarly, if player it is in X2,1, then
cit(s) ≤ x1,1 + x2,1 − yt2,1 + yt1,2 + e ({it},X1,1) + e
({it},X2,1\Y t2,1)+ e ({it}, Y t1,2) .
Our goal is to find an upper bound for
∑
i∈X1,2∪X2,1
ci(s). We will do this by summing our previous
inequalities over all players in X1,2 ∪X2,1. We claim that doing this gives us
∑
i∈X1,2∪X2,1
ci(s) ≤ x2,2x1,2 + x1,1x2,1 +
x21,2 + x1,2
2
+
x22,1 + x2,1
2
+ x1,2x2,1
+ e(X2,2,X1,2) + e(X1,1,X2,1) + e(X1,2) + e(X2,1) + e(X1,2,X2,1). (1)
To prove Inequality (1), we will consider each term separately. Clearly,
∑
i∈X1,2
x2,2 = x2,2x1,2
and
∑
i∈X2,1
x1,1 = x1,1x2,1. Similarly, we observe that
∑
i∈X1,2
e(i,X2,2) = e(X1,2,X2,2) and∑
i∈X2,1
e(i,X1,1) = e(X2,1,X1,1).
Next, we consider
∑
it∈X1,2
(x1,2−yt1,2). Consider the first player it in X1,2 to leave the coalition.
Then yt1,2 = 0, since no player in X1,2 has left the coalition before it. For the second player it′ in
X1,2 to leave the coalition, y
t′
1,2 = 1, because player it ∈ Y t
′
1,2. If we continue to repeat this process,
we observe that for the kth player it in X1,2 to leave the coalition, y
t
1,2 = k − 1. Thus, it follows
that ∑
it∈X1,2
(
x1,2 − yt1,2
)
=
x1,2−1∑
k=0
(x1,2 − k) =
x21,2 + x1,2
2
.
Now we consider
∑
it∈X1,2
e({it},X1,2\Y t1,2). Consider an edge (it, it′) where it, it′ ∈ X1,2, t < t′.
Since it′ /∈ Y t1,2, (it, it′) ∈ E(it,X1,2\Y t1,2) which means that the edge is counted for player it in the
sum above. However, since it ∈ Y t′1,2, (it, it′) /∈ E(it′ ,X1,2\Y t
′
1,2) which means that the edge is not
counted for player it′ in this sum. Thus, we conclude that each edge in E(X1,2) is counted exactly
once. That is, ∑
it∈X1,2
e
({it},X1,2\Y t1,2) = e (X1,2) .
Similar analysis holds for players in X2,1. That is,
∑
it∈X2,1
(
x2,1 − yt2,1
)
=
x22,1+x2,1
2 and
∑
it∈X2,1
e
({it},X2,1\Y t2,1) = e (X2,1).
We will now calculate
∑
it∈X1,2
yt2,1+
∑
it∈X2,1
yt1,2. Consider a pair of players it ∈ X1,2 and
it′ ∈ X2,1. Suppose, without loss of generality, that it leaves the coalition first. Since it′ /∈ Y t2,1
and it ∈ Y t′1,2, this pair contributes 1 to our sum. Since this holds for every pair of players and
there are x1,2x2,1 such pairs, we conclude that
∑
it∈X1,2
yt2,1+
∑
it∈X2,1
yt1,2 = x1,2x2,1. Similarly,∑
it∈X1,2
e({it}, Y t2,1)+
∑
it∈X2,1
e({it}, Y t1,2) = e(X1,2,X2,1).
Combining these results gives us (1).
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We will now consider another deviating coalition, X1,1 ∪X2,2, which results in the state s′. The
exact same analysis holds for this coalition, giving us
∑
i∈X1,1∪X2,2
ci(s) ≤ x2,2x1,2 + x1,1x2,1 +
x21,1 + x1,1
2
+
x22,2 + x2,2
2
+ x1,1x2,2
+ e(X2,2,X1,2) + e(X1,1,X2,1) + e(X1,1) + e(X2,2) + e(X1,1,X2,2). (2)
We can combine (1) and (2) to give us an upper bound on c(s). Using this inequality and the value
of c(s∗), we can derive
c(s) ≤
2∑
k=1
2∑
l=1
(
x2k,l + xk,l
2
+ e (Xu,v)
)
+ 2x2,2x1,2 + 2x1,1x2,1 + x1,2x2,1
+ x1,1x2,2 + 2e (X2,2,X1,2) + 2e (X1,1,X2,1) + e (X1,2,X2,1) + e (X1,1,X2,2)
=
1
2
c(s∗) +
n
2
+ x2,2x1,2 + x1,1x2,1 + x1,2x2,1 + x1,1x2,2
+ e (X2,2,X1,2) + e (X1,1,X2,1) + e (X1,2,X2,1) + e (X1,1,X2,2)
=
1
2
c(s∗) +
n
2
+ x2,2x1,2 + x1,1x2,1 + x1,2x2,1 + x1,1x2,2
+ |E| − e (X1,1,X1,2)− e (X2,1,X2,2)−
2∑
k=1
2∑
l=1
e (Xk,l)
Adding 12c(s) to both sides, and applying Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6 allows us to derive
3
2
c(s) ≤ 1
2
c(s∗) +
n
2
+
1
2
2∑
k=1
2∑
l=1
x2k,l + x1,1x1,2 + x2,1x2,2
+ x2,2x1,2 + x1,1x2,1 + x1,2x2,1 + x1,1x2,2 + |E|
=
1
2
c(s∗) +
n
2
+
1
2
(x1,1 + x1,2 + x2,1 + x2,2)
2 + |E|
=
1
2
c(s∗) +
n
2
+
n2
2
+ |E|
≤
(
2 +
1
n
)
c(s∗)
which completes the proof. 
Unfortunately, this bound is not tight; the best lower bound we have found for the strong price
of anarchy is 54 , using the same example as the one used in [14].
Claim 3.14. The strong price of anarchy of Balancing with Conflicts with m = 2 is at least 54 .
Proof. Let G be a path on four nodes. The solution in which two jobs are assigned to each machine
such that no job incurs edge cost is the optimal solution with c(s∗) = 8.
Consider the solution s formed by assigning the two degree one jobs to one machine and the
other two jobs to the other machine. Then the degree one jobs each have cost 2 and the other two
jobs have cost 3, which means c(s) = 10. Since neither of the jobs with cost 2 will join a deviating
coalition, this solution is a strong Nash equilibrium. 
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Finally, we give the corresponding results for Balancing with Friendship.
Theorem 3.15. The optimal solution is a strong Nash equilibrium for Balancing with Friendship
with m = 2, and the strong price of anarchy is at most 43 .
4 Sharing with Conflicts
Definition. We are given a set of players N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, a set of machines M = {1, 2, . . . ,m}
with positive values P = {p1, p2, . . . , pm}, and G = (N,E), an undirected graph on the player set.
Each player must assign a job to a single machine to be processed.
We will use the same notation as we did in Balancing with Conflicts. Each machine k will
distribute the pk utility associated with it equally among the jobs assigned to it. Each job will
receive 1 utility for each edge e that it shares with another job that is assigned to another machine.
We define the utility of job i with si = k as ui(s) =
pk
xk(s)
+
∑
l 6=k e({i},Xl(s)). Finally, we define the
utility of a solution s, denoted u(s), as the sum of the utility of all jobs. That is, u(s) =
∑
i∈N ui(s).
4.1 Tight Bounds for Quality of CCE
We will now provide analysis of the Sharing with Conflicts game. Observe that Sharing with
Conflicts is an exact potential game with Φ(s) =
∑m
k=1
∑xk(s)
l=1
pk
l
+
∑m−1
k=1
∑m
l=k+1 e (Xk(s),Xl(s)),
which guarantees the existence of pure Nash equilibria. We will now prove the main result of this
section: Sharing with Conflicts is semi-smooth. This, along with our lower bound example, will
give tight price of anarchy bounds for many equilibrium concepts.
Theorem 4.1. Sharing with Conflicts is
(
m−1
m
, m−2
m
)
-semi-smooth.
Proof. Let s be an outcome, and let di denote the degree of player i in G. We will assume that
n ≥ m, but this argument works similarly for n < m. Suppose, without loss of generality, that only
the first t machines have players assigned to them in s. Then u(s) ≥ ∑tk=1 pk. For each player i
with si = k, ui(s) = pk · xk(s)−1 +
∑
l 6=k e({i},Xl(s)). If player i deviates to a different machine
l, then their utility will be the sum of pl divided by the number of players already on machine l
plus 1 for itself and the number of edges from i to players not on l. That is, for each s′i = l 6= si,
ui(s
′
i, s−i) = pl · (xl(s) + 1)−1 +
∑
k 6=l e({i},Xk(s)). For each player i, let σi denote the mixed
strategy in which every strategy s′i ∈ Si is selected with probability 1m . Then using the fact that
xl(s) = 0 for l > t allows us to derive that for every player i with si = k,
E[ui(σi, s−i)] =
1
m

 m∑
l=1:l 6=k
pl
xl(s) + 1
+
pk
xk(s)
+
m∑
l=1
∑
l′ 6=l
e({i},Xl′ (s))

 .
It is easy to see that
∑m
l=1
∑
l′ 6=l e({i},Xl′ (s)) = (m− 1)di, since all edges from i to each machine
l appear m− 1 times in the sum. Notice also that for machines l > t, we know that xl(s) = 0 by
definition of t, and so pl
xl(s)+1
= pl. Thus,
E[ui(σi, s−i)] =
1
m

 t∑
l=1:l 6=k
pl
xl(s) + 1
+
m∑
l=t+1
pl +
pk
xk(s)
+ (m− 1)di


≥ 1
m
(
pk
xk(s)
+
m∑
l=t+1
pl + (m− 1)di
)
.
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By linearity of expectation and the fact that
∑
i:si=k
pk
xk(s)
= pk,
E
[∑
i∈N
ui(σi, s−i)
]
=
∑
i∈N
E[ui(σi, s−i)]
≥ 1
m
(
t∑
l=1
pl + n
m∑
l=t+1
pl + 2(m− 1)|E|
)
It is clear that for any solution s′, u(s′) ≤ ∑ml=1 pl + 2|E|. Using this, our lower bound for u(s),
and the fact that n ≥ m, we can show our previous quantity is at least
1
m
(
t∑
l=1
pl + 2(m− 1)|E|
)
+
m− 1
m
m∑
l=t+1
pl ≥ m− 1
m
(
m∑
l=1
pl + 2|E|
)
− m− 2
m
t∑
l=1
pl
≥ m− 1
m
u(s∗)− m− 2
m
u(s).
The same argument works when n < m because we can ignore the m− n machines with the least
value. Players only need to deviate to the n machines with the highest value, and the upper bound
we obtain for OPT is lower since at most n machines can be covered. 
We will now give a lower bound for the price of stability, which also acts as a lower bound for
the price of anarchy, to show that the upper bound we found with semi-smoothness is tight.
Claim 4.2. The price of stability of the Sharing with Conflicts game is at most 2, and it is tight.
Proof. Let n = m, G = Km, p1 = m
2 −m + ǫ for any ǫ > 0 and for all machines k 6= 1, pk = 0.
The optimal solution is to assign each job to a different machine, in which case every job receives
m−1 utility from edges and the job assigned to machine 1 receives an additional m2−m+ ǫ utility
from the machine. Thus, u(s∗) = 2m2 − 2m+ ǫ.
Any player is guaranteed to receive at least m−1+ ǫ
m
utility if they choose machine 1. However,
each player can receive at most m−1 utility if they choose any of the other machines. We conclude
that the solution s formed by assigning all jobs to machine 1 is the only pure Nash equilibrium.
We observe that u(s) = m2 −m+ ǫ which approaches 12u(s∗) as ǫ→ 0.
Theorem 4.1 guarantees that the price of anarchy is at most 2, which implies the price of
stability cannot exceed 2. 
This same example also shows that the strong price of stability is 2. The following price of
anarchy results follow immediately from Theorem 4.1 and our lower bound example from Claim 4.2:
Corollary 4.3. The price of total anarchy is at most 2, and it is tight. The same holds for the
strong price of anarchy.
This result is interesting because the price of anarchy for the market sharing game with m
machines is 2 − 1
m
and the price of anarchy of the max k-cut game is k
k−1 . For m > 2, this
is lower than the price of stability (and anarchy) of Sharing with Conflicts. Since our game is
essentially a combination of these two games, this means that combining two games can lead to
greater inefficiency.
Finally, we will consider convergence for the Sharing with Conflicts game. Our convergence
results for Sharing with Conflicts are weaker than those for Balancing with Conflicts because Sharing
with Conflicts is not a perfect game, which means we cannot use the convergence result from [1].
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Instead, we use a generalization of the convergence result from [27] to obtain our first result: that
a good solution is reached very quickly. Then we use a modified version of the convergence result
from [1] that does not require the game to be perfect. The trade-off is that the approximation
factor of the solutions reached is not as good. We observe that log(n) · Φ(s) ≥ u(s) ≥ 12Φ(s) for
this game. Thus, by Theorems 4.1, 2.6, and 2.7, we have the following two convergence results.
Corollary 4.4. For any Sharing with Conflicts instance and for any ǫ > 0, the BR dynamic reaches
a state st with u(st) ≥ 12+2ǫ · u(s∗) from any starting state s0 in at most O
(
n
ǫ
log u(s∗)
)
steps.
Corollary 4.5. For any Sharing with Conflicts instance and for any ǫ > 0, the BR dynamic
converges to a state st with u(st) ≥ 1−ǫ4 log(n) · u(s∗) in at most O
(
n
log(n) log
1
ǫ
)
steps from any
initial state. Furthermore, all future states reached with best-response dynamics will satisfy this
approximation factor as well.
4.2 Extensions
4.2.1 Weighted Edges
All of our results in the previous section hold using the same arguments if we allow the edges to
have positive weights and redefine the utility function of a job i such that it receives we utility for
each edge e that it shares with another job that is assigned to another machine. Thus, unlike in
Section 3, the bounds on the efficiency of equilibrium remain small (at most 2) even in the presence
of weighted edges.
4.2.2 Sharing with Friendship
Definition. Just as we considered a utility version of the Balancing with Conflicts game, we
will now consider a utility version of the Balancing with Friendship game. The Sharing with
Friendship game is the same as the Sharing with Conflicts game except that jobs receive additional
utility for sharing edges with jobs on the same machine. That is, for every job i with si = k,
ui(s) =
pk
xk(s)
+ e({i},Xk(s)).
We will prove similar results for the Sharing with Friendship using the same arguments as we did
for the Sharing with Conflicts. Furthermore, all of these results hold if we allow arbitrary positive
edge weights. Sharing with Friendship is an exact potential game with Φ(s) =
∑m
k=1
∑xk(s)
l=1
pk
l
+∑m
k=1 ek(s).
Theorem 4.6. The Sharing with Friendship is
(
1
m
, 0
)
-semi-smooth. The price of total anarchy is
at most m, and it is tight. The price of stability is at least 2− 1
m
.
Corollary 4.7. For any Sharing with Friendship instance and for any ǫ > 0, the BR dynamic
reaches a state st with u(st) ≥ 1
m(1+ǫ) · u(s∗) from any starting state s0 in at most O
(
n
ǫ
log u(s∗)
)
steps.
Corollary 4.8. For any Sharing with Friendship instance and for any ǫ > 0, the BR dynamic
reaches to a state st with u(st) ≥ (1−ǫ)2m log(n) · u(s∗) in at most O
(
n
log(n) log
1
ǫ
)
steps from any ini-
tial state. Furthermore, all future states reached with best-response dynamics will satisfy this
approximation factor as well.
Unlike in Sharing with Conflicts, where existence of strong Nash equilibrium is an open question
even for m = 2, we can show that strong Nash equilibrium does not necessarily exist for this game.
The strong price of anarchy is known to be at most 3 [3], and our price of stability example gives
a lower bound of 2.
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Theorem 4.9. Strong Nash equilibrium need not exist for the Sharing with Friendship game.
Proof. Consider an instance in which G is a graph with 4 nodes and the edges (1, 2) and (3, 4).
There are two machines with values 2 + ǫ and 4 + 3ǫ for some ǫ > 0. It is easily verified that no
strong Nash equilibrium exists for this instance. 
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we introduce several new job-assignment games, such as Balancing with Conflicts,
Balancing with Friendship, and Sharing with Conflicts, which allow us to model positive and
negative interactions between certain pairs of jobs. For both games, we provide tight or nearly-
tight bounds on the price of anarchy for pure Nash, mixed Nash, correlated, coarse correlated, and
strong Nash equilibria. We also bound the time needed for convergence to near-optimal outcomes.
For most of these results, we make use of the notion of semi-smoothness [7] and observe that
standard smoothness [27] is not sufficient for achieving tight bounds.
There are a number of natural avenues for further study. Some of the more direct extensions
include generalizing our existing results to broader classes of latency functions; in the case of
balancing with conflicts, proving tight bounds on the price of anarchy seems difficult even for
related machines, and may require new techniques.
Another promising direction is to improve bounds on the quality of equilibria when the conflict
graph’s structure is constrained. For example, consider our motivating scenario in which jobs
conflict over the use of certain computational resources. If the number of distinct resource types
is small, the set of possible conflict graphs is limited and thus better bounds may apply. More
generally, it would be interesting to find any structural parametrization that increases equilibrium
quality.
Perhaps most interesting would be a broader exploration of the process of combining games. All
of the games studied in this paper can be viewed as a “sum” of simpler games. Given any pair of
games G1 and G2 in which the players and their strategy sets are the same, we can define a new game
G1 ⊕ G2 with the same players, the same strategies, and utilities given by ui(s) = u1i (s) + u2i (s),
where uji is i’s utility function in Gj . In particular, the games we introduced are sums of load
balancing games, market sharing games, and cut games. To what extent do these new games
inherit properties of their component games? Some relationships are straightforward – if G1 and
G2 are potential games, then clearly so too is G1 ⊕ G2. Similarly, one can bound the smoothness
of G1 ⊕ G2 in terms of that of G1 and G2 (although the naive bounds do not appear to be tight).
Under what conditions and to what extent are various game characteristics (such as smoothness)
preserved under this game operator? Are there natural classes of games that are well behaved
under this operation? The same questions can be applied to other game operators as well, such
as product, min, and max. The development of tools for analyzing such operators is a promising
direction for future research.
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